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The consistency of false suggestions moderates children's reports of a single instance of a repeated event: Predicting increases and decreases in suggestibility

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Abstract

Participants (6- and 7-year-olds, N = 130) participated in classroom activities four times. Children were interviewed about the final occurrence (target event) either 1 week or 4 weeks later, during which half of the event items were described inaccurately. Half of these suggestions were consistent with the theme of the detail across the occurrences (e.g., always sat on a kind of floor mat) or were inconsistent (e.g., sat on a chair). When memory for the target event was tested 1 day later, children falsely recognized fewer inconsistent suggestions than consistent suggestions, especially compared with a control group of children who experienced the event just one time. Furthermore, the longer delay reduced accuracy only for consistent suggestions. Source-monitoring ability was strongly and positively related to resistance to suggestions, and encouraging children to identify the source of false suggestions allowed them to retract a significant proportion of their reports of inconsistent suggestions determines whether event repetition increases or decreases suggestibility. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Eyewitness memory; Suggestibility; Repeated events; Source monitoring; Schema

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Introduction

After decades of careful research, there is now a broad knowledge base on the capabilities and vulnerabilities of child witnesses (for a review, see Gordon, Baker-Ward, & Ornstein, 2001). Because a sizable proportion of child witnesses allege multiple crimes, it is unfortunate that most of the research has studied children's eyewitness memories for isolated events. Children's memories of repeated events differ quantitatively and qualitatively from memories of events experienced just one time (Fivush, 1984; Fivush, Kuebli, & Clubb, 1992; Kuebli & Fivush, 1994; Powell & Thomson, 1996; see also review by Hudson, Fivush, & Kuebli, 1992). Repeated experience, for example, can wipe out age differences in suggestibility (Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999). Hence, there is a major omission in our knowledge of the processes affecting children's testimony, and scientists are limited in their ability to provide the legal profession with empirically based conclusions about children's memories of repeated experiences.

An especially important issue is children's suggestibility after repeated experiences. Compared with reports from children who have experienced an event one time, event repetition makes children highly resistant to suggestions about details that were identical in each occurrence of the event (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell et al., 1999). It is not yet clear, however, how event repetition affects reactions to suggestions about details that vary each time (e.g., a child abuse victim could be abused at different times and in different places). Repetition of items that vary in each occurrence has been shown to increase suggestibility (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell & Roberts, 2002), to decrease suggestibility (Powell, Roberts, & Thomson, 2000), and to have no discernible effect on suggestibility (Powell & Roberts, 2002; Powell et al., 1999). To this point, researchers have identified postevent factors that determine the direction of event repetition effects on suggestibility. Event repetition is more likely to increase children's suggestibility when, for example, the suggestions are explicitly linked to the occurrence that is later the target of the memory test rather than linked generally to the series of events (Powell et al., 2000). It is probable, however, that qualities of the event representation itself influence suggestibility, and so we investigated whether the consistency of suggestions to the gist of experienced details affected levels of suggestibility. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that children would be more suggestible when the suggestions were consistent with the gist of experienced details than when they were gist inconsistent and that this effect would be stronger in children with prior experience of the event than in those with no prior experience.

A second aim of this investigation was to determine the relation between source-monitoring skills and suggestibility after repeated experiences. Specifically, we tested whether source-monitoring instructions enabled children to retract their false reports, and we expected that such instructions would be more successful in retracting reports of gistinconsistent suggestions than of gist-consistent suggestions. We begin by discussing memory representations of repeated experiences.

The consistency effect

Children can have remarkably good memories of routine events (Davidson, 1996; Roberts & Powell, 2001). Like adults, children have the capacity to store large amounts of knowledge in schemata or knowledge structures that contain typical elements of a given entity such as people, objects, places, and events (Fivush, 1984; Nelson, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977).

In adults, recognition memory for details that are atypical or inconsistent with a script are recognized more than details that are typical or consistent with a script, known as the *typicality effect* or *consistency effect* (e.g., Erdfelder & Bredenkamp, 1998; Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998; Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001; Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, & Toglia, 2002; Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989).

Although there is a reliable body of knowledge on the consistency effect in adults' memories, the consistency effect has been documented in children's memories on just a few occasions (Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). Models of script development in children such as the script confirmation-deployment model (Farrar & Goodman, 1992) suggest that, after a script has been established (i.e., the *script deployment phase*), atypical details are episodically encoded, whereas there is no need to store such detailed information about typical details because these are already represented in the script. Recognition cues provide an exact match to the episodic trace, thereby rendering more accurate recognition of atypical details than of typical details. Thus, one can speculate that children may remember atypical details, and thus reject false suggestions about them, but may be less likely to remember the exact details of items that were typical of a script and, consequently, be misled by false suggestions about typical details.

The consistency effect and suggestibility

Predictions about how the consistency effect may influence children's suggestibility can also be made from fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). According to fuzzy-trace theory, event memories are dually represented as both verbatim details that comprise the exact surface form of details (e.g., sat in the seat next to the bathroom) and gist representations containing the general sense of what happened (e.g., ate at McDonald's). False memories occur in one of two ways (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002). First, a verbatim representation from a different event may be retrieved (e.g., recall that sat next to the window). Second, gist traces may be retrieved, leading to a feeling of familiarity when gist-consistent, but false, details are presented (e.g., ate at Burger King). False memories of the first kind have been amply demonstrated in studies of repeated event memories (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990; Powell & Roberts, 2002; Powell et al., 1999). False memories of the second kind are of interest in the current study. According to fuzzy-trace theory, false-but-gist-consistent memory errors should be most likely when the gist representation is strong. Because gist representations may be strengthened by the repetition of similar events, fuzzy-trace theory predicts that children will be more resistant to gist-inconsistent suggestions than to gist-consistent suggestions after repeated experiences.

In a recent study, 7-year-olds participated either two or four times in a standard event (interacting with a wizard) and then participated just one time in a similar event that deviated from the standard event (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). Some deviations were typical or script consistent (e.g., finger painting), and the rest were atypical or script inconsistent (e.g., having a snack). The 7-year-olds recalled more script-inconsistent deviations than script-consistent deviations. These results replicate Davidson and Hoe's (1993) study demonstrating the consistency effect in children's story recall. In addition, Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999) found that 4-year-olds were able to separate memories of scripted details from memories of deviant details when the standard event was simplified, and they argued that this enabled the 4-year-olds to form a script even though their

cognitive resources were more limited than those of the older children. Thus, the pattern of results was similar in these different age groups. There are many examples of younger children remembering the details of repeated events as well as older children, in contrast to the age differences found when children recall an event that they have experienced just one time (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990; Powell et al., 1999). Thus, both empirical evidence and contemporary theories of repeated event memories suggest that the crucial variable in consistency effects is not age per se but rather the repetition of experiences that allows gist extraction.

Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999) were interested in children's memories of details that were actually experienced, whereas the current investigation focused on children's false memories of details that were never experienced. Also, Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999) studied memories of a single deviation occurrence, and so we still do not understand the mechanisms involved in memories of a single instance of a repeated event that consists of details that vary each time the event is experienced. This is a crucial difference because memory of a single variation after prior experiences is quite accurate, whereas children are highly confused when recalling a specific instance of a detail that differs each time they experience the event (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell et al., 1999). Powell and colleagues, for example, observed a success rate of just 25% when children were asked to describe a specific instance of a variable detail, and this error rate did not differ between 3-to 5-year-olds and 6- to 8-year-olds (see Table 4 in Powell et al., 1999). Hence, it is not yet clear how the consistency of suggestions contributes to the production of false memories of a single instance of a repeated variable event.

The results of one other study are also relevant to the current investigation. Ornstein and colleagues (1998) highlighted the role of prior knowledge of medical examinations in 4- and 6-year-olds' ability to resist suggestions about actions that never occurred during a specific examination. Ornstein and colleagues found that children, when asked about features that were not present during the examination, were better able to correctly deny the atypical suggestions (e.g., measure head circumference) than to correctly deny the typical suggestions (e.g., check weight). Ornstein and colleagues' study addressed the role that prior knowledge, rather than prior experience, played in children's false memory creation of consistent and inconsistent suggestions. Thus, the children's knowledge of medical examinations was not experimentally created, and children may have acquired their knowledge through books, television, classroom learning, and so on in addition to their own experiences.

In the current study, then, we directly investigated whether the consistency of suggestions to details that were repeated across a series of occurrences affected children's resistance to those suggestions. Although we expected that all children would be more resistant to script-inconsistent suggestions than to script-consistent suggestions, we expected that children with prior experience would show a magnified effect compared with those with no prior experience. Specifically, we expected that children with prior experience would be more resistant to script-inconsistent suggestions than would children with a single experience. Repetition should create stronger gist representations, making inconsistent items stand out (cf. the von Restorff effect [Koffka, 1935]) and thus increasing resistance to them.

As a supplementary investigation, we tested the parameters of the expected effect by testing children's memories after either 1 week or 4 weeks, expecting that the effects would be greater after 4 weeks. Several studies with adults have documented higher levels of false alarms for script-consistent features when memory is tested after a delay rather than

immediately after (Greenberg et al., 1998; Lampinen et al., 2001; Neuschatz et al., 2002). These findings make sense according to schema plus correction models that conceptualize tags linking atypical details to the memory representation. Over time, the tags are forgotten but the script is stable. Hence, after a delay, typical features seem more familiar or plausible than do atypical features. According to fuzzy-trace theory, verbatim memories disintegrate faster than do gist memories, and so fuzzy-trace theory also predicts that the consistency effect would be greater after a delay (Brainerd & Poole, 1997).

Source monitoring and suggestibility

The second main aim of this investigation was to assess whether source-monitoring skills contributed to children's suggestibility after repeated experiences. To see whether children genuinely believed that the false details had taken place during the target occurrence, a source-monitoring test was administered requiring children to attribute the source of details to the target occurrence or to the interviewer who had provided the false suggestions. We expected that resistance to suggestions and source monitoring would be positively correlated and that children in the repeated-experience condition would inaccurately attribute more false-consistent suggestions than false-inconsistent suggestions to the target occurrence. One of the mechanisms of fuzzy-trace theory is "phantom recollection" (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001), a process describing how details can be confabulated, leading to false-but-gist-consistent memories that actually contain verbatim details. Such confabulation is most likely when (a) the gist trace is especially strong and (b) the false suggestion is a particularly good match for the gist trace. Such conditions are fulfilled when repeated experiences of an event have strengthened the gist trace and highly gist-consistent suggestions are offered. Hence, children with repeated experience may retrieve verbatim details and mistakenly assume that they actually observed those details.

The presence of a relation between children's source monitoring and suggestibility for script-consistent and script-inconsistent items would be promising for forensic interviewing techniques. In some studies, orienting children to source helped them to "retract" their false reports (e.g., Leichtman & Ceciet, 1995; Poole & Lindsay, 2001). Poole and Lindsay (2001), for example, induced false reports of never-experienced science demonstrations and found that, when children were asked to discriminate whether the fictitious demonstration occurred for real or in a story, 8-year-olds retracted 67% of their false reports. Thus, we also investigated whether a source-monitoring test would help children to retract their false reports. We expected that retraction rates would be higher for script-inconsistent false memories than for script-consistent false memories because more episodic information about source would be encoded for the former items. This latter prediction stems from schema theories of memory supporting a "cognitive economy" mechanism (e.g., Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Schank, 1999). Specifically, consistent details need not be stored episodically because memories can be reconstructed from the schema, whereas inconsistent details that are not part of a schema need to be encoded episodically. Furthermore, although schemata allowed the efficient encoding of gist in a study with adults, perceptual encoding was inhibited when script-consistent items were presented (Von Hippel, Jonides, Hilton, & Narayan, 1993). Such perceptual information may include contextual details that can later be retrieved and used to specify source. Thus, we expected that episodic information pertaining to script-inconsistent items can be better encoded, stored, and thus made available for source attribution than can episodic information pertaining to script-consistent items.

Design

Children (6- and 7-year-olds) participated in four occurrences of a scripted event and were given a biasing interview during which the interviewer gave false descriptions that were consistent or inconsistent with the theme of the details that had been set up over the four occurrences. Memory for the last occurrence (the *target*) was tested at a memory interview either 1 week or 4 weeks after the target occurrence, and the interviewer probed both the true and false descriptions of the target details. In addition, data were gathered from a control group of children who experienced the event just one time. Hence, the study comprised a 2 (Experience: single or repeat) \times 2 (Delay: 1 week or 4 weeks) between-subjects experimental design. Two thirds of the participants were also given a source-monitoring interview immediately after the memory interview.

Participants

A total of 130 children (64 girls and 66 boys) between the ages of 6 years 0 months and 7 years 8 months (M=6 years 8 months, SD=4.11 months) participated in the study. The children were recruited from schools in or near Melbourne, Australia, and their parents gave informed consent. Children participated in the event in groups of 20 to 28, and the groups were randomly assigned to experience and delay conditions with the constraint that the cells were approximately equal in the mean age in months and gender distribution.

Materials and procedure

The events

The activity was carried out either once or on 4 different days over a 2-week period in the children's schools and was administered by a trained research assistant (RA) to groups of 20 to 28 children (although only children whose parents gave informed consent participated in the interviews). Teachers were instructed not to talk with the children about the activities or to inform them that they would later be interviewed. No person other than the children's teacher, the RA, and the children were present in the room during the activities.

The to-be-remembered event was a scripted 30-min activity that was modeled on that used by Powell and Thomson (1996) in their study showing scripted memories in young children. The event was labeled for the children as the "Deakin Activities" (Table 1). The activity consisted of 16 target items embedded in several activities: physical exercise, listening to a story, doing a puzzle, getting a surprise, and relaxing. Each of the 16 target items differed across the four occurrences and was related to a theme (e.g., children always sat on something at floor level—cardboard, rubber mat, garbage bag, white sheet, newspaper, or pillow [Item 1 in Table 1]). (For clarity, we use Item 1 as an example throughout the Method section.) Four item sets were created, each of which contained instantiations from four different groups (e.g., one group experienced items from the columns labeled C, D, B, and E), and the items were presented in different orders in each set.

Table 1	
Pool of items	in the event

Number	Item	Instantiation						
		A	В	С	D	Е	F	
1	Children's seat	Cardboard	Rubber mat	Garbage bag	White sheet	Newspaper	Pillow	
2	Cloak of leader	Red	Yellow	White	Blue	Green	Black	
3	Koala's name	Boo	Kip	Pop	Stan	Jo	Lee	
4	Noisy animal	Kangaroo	Goanna	Kookaburra	Dingo	Wombat	Possum	
5	Warm-up activity	Run	Wiggle fingers	Touch toes	Jump	Dance	Sit-ups	
6	Source of story	Garbage bin at Deakin University	Leader wrote on Deakin University instruction	Posted by Deakin University person	Library at Deakin University	Present under tree from Deakin University friend	Deakin University bookshop	
7	Content of story	Horse	Lucky rabbit	Fly	Supercat	Elephant	Worm	
8	Child who holds up pictures	Child A	Child B	Child C	Child D	Child E	Child F	
9	Utensil to note who child is	Pencil	Crayon	Chalk	Marker	Lipstick	Paint	
10	Puzzle	Waving a wand	Playing guitar	Balancing balls	Juggling	Walking on tightrope	Bicycling	
11	Music/Scene for resting	Beach	Kites	Birds	Rain	Park	Circus	
12	Part of body is relaxed	Legs	Nose	Stomach	Arms	Ears	Chin	
13	Method of getting refreshed	Baby wipe	Lip gloss	Hand cream	Face spray	Cool drink	Ice pack	
14	Theme of sticker	Rocket	Rainbow	Star	Flag	Sun	Aeroplane	
15	Container with stickers	Box	Purse	Envelope	Jar	Basket	Metal tin	
16	Next stop	To movie	Walking a dog	Visiting friend in hospital	Birthday party	Going on holiday	Shop for some new clothes	

The target occurrence was tagged for children in the repeated-experience condition by introducing a change in the fourth and final occurrence. Either the events were led by a new RA—one who was different from the RA who administered the previous three occurrences (at least 10 characteristics [e.g., hair color] distinguished the two RAs)—or an object that was always present in the activities (a badge or a necklace) was changed. The way in which the target event was tagged was counterbalanced across the different Experience × Delay cells, but this was not an experimental manipulation and the results did not differ based on which tag was used. The RA and objects were also used in the event in the single-experience conditions, but obviously their presence did not tag a change.

The biasing interview

Either 1 week or 4 weeks after the only or last occurrence, an unfamiliar RA carried out the biasing interview. The interviewer explained that she was not present during the target event and needed to find out what happened that day. The child was asked to focus on either "the day you wore the badge/necklace" or "the day that [other RA's name] did the Deakin Activities," as appropriate. First, a free narrative account was elicited with prompts such as "What happened next" and "What else can you tell me about the Deakin Activities the day you ...?" The free narrative provided a check that all children could remember the activities. The RA then explained that she needed to ask some more questions and that the child should answer them as best he or she could even if the details had been described earlier.

The 16 questions that followed were in the form of *presuppositional questions* (Roberts, Lamb, & Sternberg, 1999) that are known to effectively elicit suggestibility effects. In 8 of the 16 questions, an item from the target event was described inaccurately but was still plausible. Of these 8 false suggestions, 4 were consistent with the theme of the item (false-consistent details); for example, if the child sat on a garbage bag, the interviewer would ask, "I heard that the leader brought you something to sit on the day you wore the badge to the Deakin Activities. What color was the newspaper you sat on that day?" (i.e., something that was at floor level). The other 4 false suggestions were inconsistent with the theme (false-inconsistent details); for example, the interviewer would ask, "What color was the wooden chair you sat on that day?" (i.e., an item that was not at floor level). The remaining 8 questions probed accurate descriptions of items from the target event (true details [e.g., "What color was the garbage bag you sat on that day?"]). The assignment of items to true, false-consistent, and false-inconsistent status was counterbalanced across the four item sets.

The 16 questions were asked in random order, and then the RA explained that she had to go through to check that she had all of the child's answers. The interviewer replayed back to the child each of the 16 questions and the child's corresponding answers, thereby securing commitment to the false suggestions.

Memory interview

The following day, the same interviewer conducted the memory interview to see what the child remembered about the target event. After a brief period of rapport building, the interviewer explained that she had lost the child's answers and so had to ask about the activity again. She tagged the target event for the child (i.e., using the object or person change) and asked two pretest questions: one for which the correct answer was "yes" and one for which the correct answer was "no." All children correctly answered "no" to the second question, thereby ensuring that children understood that they could say "no" to a question. The RA then tested memory with one of two sets of yes/no questions (described subsequently) administered in random order. Following this, she explained that she wanted to be sure she had understood things properly, and so she needed to ask about some other things that might have happened. The second set of 16 yes/no questions was then administered.

Two sets of 16 yes/no questions were needed in the memory interview because each of the 16 target items had two corresponding questions: one probing the detail that was actually presented in the target event (true details [e.g., asking "Did you sit on a garbage bag?" when the child actually did]) and one probing a false suggestion (either false-consistent details [e.g., asking "Did you sit on a newspaper?"] or false-inconsistent details [e.g., asking "Did you sit on a wooden chair?"]). Children were asked questions about all of the details that were described in the biasing interview (recall that 8 were true details, 4 were false-consistent details, and 4 were false-inconsistent details). The alternate version of each detail was also probed at the memory interview; for items described as false consistent or false inconsistent at the biasing interview, the true versions were probed, whereas for items described accurately at the biasing interview, false-consistent suggestions were presented for half of them and false-inconsistent suggestions were presented for the remainder.

The order in which the true and false instantiations of each item were probed was counterbalanced, and the 16 questions in each set were administered in random order to each child. Thus, there was a maximum possible score of 16 correct "yes" responses for the true details questions (8 questions contained the true details at both the biasing and memory interviews, and 8 questions contained the true details at the memory interview only); a maximum score of 8 correct "no" responses for questions about false-consistent details (4 questions contained false-consistent details at the biasing interview and memory interview, and 4 questions contained false-consistent details at the memory interview only); and a maximum score of 8 correct "no" responses for questions about false-inconsistent details (4 questions contained false-consistent details at the biasing interview only); and a maximum score of 8 correct "no" responses for questions about false-inconsistent details (4 questions contained false-inconsistent details at the memory interview only); One researcher coded all transcripts, and a second researcher who was not otherwise involved in the study coded 20% of them. Interrater reliability, calculated as agreements/ (agreements + disagreements), was 98%. Discrepancies were resolved, and the codes assigned by the principal coder were used in all analyses.

The source-monitoring interview

The source-monitoring interview was carried out by the same interviewer immediately after the memory interview and was given to all children in the single-experience conditions and, due to resource constraints, to half of the children in the repeated-experience condition.¹ The interviewer explained that she was still a little confused and needed to find out whether the child actually saw certain details. The interviewer questioned the child about four false-consistent and four false-inconsistent details (these items had been falsely described at the biasing interview). The interviewer gave a false description (e.g., the news-paper when in fact the child actually sat on a garbage bag) and asked "Did you *see* the newspaper that day or did I only *tell* you about the newspaper?" ("see" and "tell" options

¹ Specifically, children in the repeated-experience condition whose target event was tagged by a change in an object (badge or necklace) were given the source-monitoring interview. To see whether the way in which the target event was tagged affected source monitoring, a 2 (Tag: object or person) independent samples *t* test was conducted on the source-monitoring scores, and there was no effect, t(97) = -0.89, p = .37. In addition, the analyses of the memory interview responses (i.e., using data from all children in the repeated-experience condition) were repeated using data from only those children who also provided source-monitoring interview responses, and the findings were identical. Because there was no evidence that there was any difference in the children who did and did not provide source-monitoring interview responses, analyses of the memory interview comprise the full sample and all source-monitoring interview data were included in the source-monitoring interview analyses so as not to restrict sample size.

were alternated). The true description of each of the items was also probed (e.g., "Did you sit on the garbage bag? Did you see the garbage bag or did I only tell you about the garbage bag?"), resulting in a 16-item test. The order in which the true and false details were presented was counterbalanced. The child was then thanked and escorted back to the regular classroom.

Responses were coded as accurate if children identified the target event as the source of true items and identified the interviewer as the source of false-consistent and false-inconsistent items. Interrater agreement was at least 98% across all response types.

Results

There are three sections to the results. In the first section, children's responses to the memory interview are presented (broken down by how the items were described at the biasing interview). In the second section, the source-monitoring interview responses are presented. Finally, analyses showing children's retraction of false reports are presented.

Responses at the memory interview

Items described inaccurately at the biasing interview

A 2 (Experience: single or repeated) \times 2 (Delay: 1 week or 4 weeks) \times 2 (Biasing Interview Suggestion: false consistent or false inconsistent) \times 2 (Detail: true or false) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run on the number of correct responses to the yes/no questions. Biasing interview suggestion and detail were within-subjects variables. The false suggestions at the memory interview were identical to the false suggestions at the biasing interview (e.g., false-consistent items in the biasing interview were also false-consistent items at the memory interview), and so the detail variable contained just two levels (true and false). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.

There was a main effect of biasing interview suggestion because responses to questions about items that were false inconsistent at the biasing interview (M = 5.86, SD = 1.71) were more accurate than those that were false consistent (M = 5.54, SD = 1.73), F(1, 126) = 4.66,

Table 2

The memory interview: Mean accurate responses to questions about items falsely described at the biasing interview

Description in biasing interview	False-consist	ent items	False-inconsistent items		
Description in memory interview	True	False consistent	True	False inconsistent	
Condition					
Single experience					
1 week $(n = 35)$	3.26 (0.89)	2.83 (0.92)	3.29 (0.93)	3.14 (0.88)	
4 weeks $(n = 35)$	3.03 (0.89)	2.23 (1.17)	3.40 (0.85)	2.46 (1.04)	
Total $(N = 70)$	3.14 (0.89)	2.53 (1.09)	3.34 (0.88)	2.80 (1.02)	
Repeated experience					
1 week $(n = 29)$	3.21 (0.90)	2.55 (1.18)	3.52 (0.74)	2.59 (1.40)	
4 weeks $(n = 31)$	2.68 (1.11)	2.35 (1.25)	2.71 (1.04)	2.29 (1.51)	
Total $(N = 60)$	2.93 (1.04)	2.45 (1.21)	3.10 (0.97)	2.43 (1.46)	

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Maximum score = 4.

p < .05. There were also main effects of delay, F(1, 122) = 9.95, p < .01, and detail, F(1, 122) = 35.57, p < .001. Overall, children interviewed after 1 week (M = 12.22, SD = 2.74) were more accurate than those interviewed after 4 weeks (M = 10.61, SD = 3.09), and there were more accurate answers given to questions about items that were described accurately (M = 6.28, SD = 1.59) than described inaccurately (M = 5.12, SD = 2.14) at the memory interview.

The main effect of experience approached significance, F(1, 122) = 2.87, p = .09, but there was a significant three-way interaction among experience, delay, and detail, F(1, 122) = 6.71, p = .01. The interaction occurred due to the combined negative effects of prior experience and a long delay. When questioned 1 week after the target event, children in both the single-experience condition, t(34) = 2.25, p = .03, and the repeated-experience condition, t(28) = 3.34, p < .01, gave more accurate responses to questions about true details than to questions about false details (single experience: Ms = 6.54 and 5.97 and SDs = 1.62 and 1.54, respectively; repeated experience: Ms = 6.72 and 5.14 and SDs = 1.22 and 2.33, respectively). When questioned after 4 weeks, although children in the single-experience condition continued to show greater accuracy when answering questions about true details than about false details (Ms = 6.43 and 4.69 and SDs = 1.33 and 1.91, respectively), t(34) = 5.67, p < .001, children in the repeated-experience condition did not (Ms = 5.39 and 4.65 and SDs = 1.84 and 2.54, respectively), t(30) = 1.45, p = .16.

Items described accurately at the biasing interview

Because there were eight true items and four each of the false-consistent and falseinconsistent suggestions, the mean for the true items was divided by 2 to enable comparison across items. A 2 (Experience: single or repeated) \times 2 (Delay: 1 week or 4 weeks) \times 3 (Detail: true, false consistent, or false inconsistent) ANOVA was run on the correct responses (as described previously), and detail was a within-subjects variable. There is no biasing interview variable because all items were described accurately at the biasing interview, and there are now three levels of the detail variable because each item from the biasing interview could be described in one of three ways at the memory interview (true, false consistent, or false inconsistent). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.

There was a main effect of detail because there were fewer accurate responses to questions containing false-consistent details (M=3.42, SD=0.80) than to questions containing either false-inconsistent details (M=3.75, SD=0.61) or true details (M=3.78, SD=0.49), F(2,252)=17.87, p<.001. The predicted detail × experience interaction was significant, F(2,252)=3.87, p<.05. Children in the repeated-experience condition (M=3.87, SD=0.43) were more resistant to questions probing false-inconsistent items than were children in the single-experience condition (M=3.66, SD=0.72), t(128)=-1.97, p<.05. However, there were no effects of experience on responses to questions about true or false-consistent details (see means in Table 3), ts(128) < 1.50, ps > .15.

In sum, responses at the memory interview showed that children were more resistant to inconsistent suggestions than to consistent suggestions regardless of whether the suggestions were offered at the biasing interview (when the suggestions were presupposed as being true) or at the memory interview (when yes/no questions were asked about the presence of the suggested details). The consistency effect was more pronounced for children with repeated experience than for children with a single experience.

Table 3

Description in memory interview	True ^a	False consistent	False inconsistent	
Condition				
Single experience				
1 week $(n = 35)$	3.86 (0.68)	3.46 (0.85)	3.69 (0.80)	
4 weeks $(n = 35)$	3.83 (0.36)	3.37 (0.73)	3.63 (0.65)	
Total (N = 70)	3.84 (0.54)	3.41 (0.79)	3.66 (0.72)	
Repeated experience				
1 week $(n = 29)$	3.76 (0.57)	3.59 (0.73)	3.93 (0.26)	
4 weeks $(n = 31)$	3.68 (0.39)	3.26 (0.86)	3.81 (0.54)	
Total $(N = 60)$	3.72 (0.49)	3.42 (0.81)	3.87 (0.43)	

The memory interview: Mean accurate responses to questions about items accurately described at the biasing interview

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

^a There were eight true items, and so the scores were divided by 2 to enable comparison across item scores. Maximum score = 4 for all other scores.

Responses at the source-monitoring interview

To see whether there was a consistency effect in children's source monitoring and also to see whether this was moderated by the amount of experience children had with the event, a 2 (Experience: single or repeat) × 2 (Delay: 1 week or 4 weeks) × 2 (Biasing Interview Suggestion: false consistent or false inconsistent) × 2 (Detail: true or false) ANOVA was run on the number of correct responses to the "see/tell" questions, with repeated measures on the last two independent variables. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4. There were main effects of biasing interview suggestion, F(1,95)=10.49, p < .01, and delay, F(1,95)=5.68, p < .02. As expected, there were more correct responses to questions about false-inconsistent biasing interview items (M=6.56, SD=1.44) than to questions about false-consistent biasing interview items (M=5.80, SD=1.73), and there were more correct responses when the source-monitoring interview occurred 1 week after the target event (M=13.02, SD=1.78) than when it occurred 4 weeks after the target event (M=11.73, SD=3.11).

Table 4

The source-monitoring interview: Mean accurate responses to questions about items falsely described at the biasing interview

Description in biasing interview	False consis	stent items	False inconsistent items		
Description in source-monitoring interview	True	False consistent	True	False inconsistent	
Condition					
Single experience					
1 week $(n = 35)$	3.11 (1.00)	3.00 (0.77)	3.46 (0.66)	3.51 (0.70)	
4 weeks $(n = 35)$	2.74 (1.12)	2.63 (1.22)	3.20 (0.90)	3.14 (0.77)	
Total (N = 70)	2.93 (1.00)	2.81 (1.03)	3.33 (0.79)	3.33 (0.76)	
Repeated experience					
1 week $(n = 13)$	2.92 (0.95)	3.23 (0.60)	3.38 (0.65)	3.31 (1.03)	
4 weeks $(n = 16)$	2.44 (0.96)	3.31 (0.87)	3.00 (1.10)	3.00 (1.37)	
Total $(N = 29)$	2.66 (0.97)	3.28 (0.75)	3.17 (0.93)	3.14 (1.22)	

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Maximum score = 4.

There was an interaction between biasing interview and detail, F(1,95) = 4.60, p < .05, that was qualified by an interaction among biasing interview, detail, and experience, F(1,95) = 9.58, p < .01. Follow-up tests on the biasing interview × detail interaction revealed no significant effects, although the pattern of means suggests that accurate source identification depended on the consistency of the suggestion at the biasing interview. Specifically, when true details were probed, accuracy was greatest when the false suggestion at the biasing interview was inconsistent with the theme and lowest when the suggestion was consistent with the theme (Ms = 3.28 and 2.85 and SDs = 0.83 and 0.99, respectively). The mean for items that were described as false inconsistent at both the biasing and source-monitoring interviews was 3.27 (SD = 0.91), whereas the mean for items that were described as false consistent at both interviews was 2.95 (SD = 0.97). Analyses exploring the biasing interview \times detail interaction separately for each experience condition confirmed that this pattern was evident in the responses of children in the repeated-experience condition, F(1, 28) = 8.60, p < .01, but not in the responses of children in the single-experience condition, F(1,69) < 1.00 (for the full set of means, see Table 4).

Next, to see whether there was an overall positive relation between resistance to suggestibility and source monitoring, correlations between correct responses at the memory interview and correct responses at the source-monitoring interview were computed (N=99). First, the number of correct responses during the memory interview about false-consistent items (i.e., correct rejections) was correlated with the number of correct source-monitoring responses about false-consistent items, and there was a significant positive relation both before and after controlling for age in months, rs = .57, ps < .001. Second, the number of correct responses to false-inconsistent items, and again there was a strong and significant positive relation both before and after controlling for age in months, rs = .69, ps < .001.

In sum, responses at the source-monitoring interview showed a positive relation between monitoring the source of suggestions and resistance to those suggestions. Children were as able to identify the source of false-inconsistent suggestions as to identify the source of true details that were actually in the event, but they had difficulty in identifying the source of false-consistent suggestions. Children in the repeated-experience condition were worse than children in the single-experience condition at identifying target details that were present during the event.

Retraction analyses

To see whether the source-monitoring interview was helpful in encouraging children to retract their false reports, responses to items in the memory interview were compared with children's claims in the source-monitoring interview that they had actually seen the corresponding items in the target event. Source identification of false alarms in the memory interview was tracked first and was followed by analyses of children's accurate recognition (i.e., hits). All proportional scores reported below were calculated separately for false-consistent and false-inconsistent items, and the means are presented in Table 5. In each analysis, the proportional scores were entered into a 2 (Experience: single or repeated) $\times 2$ (Biasing Interview Suggestion: false consistent or false inconsistent) ANOVA with repeated measures on the latter variable.

Table 5

The source-monitoring interview: Proportion of items that children claimed they had actually seen in the target event as a function of suggestibility in the memory interview

Memory interview response	False alarms ^a			Hits ^b				
Biasing interview description	False consistent		False inconsistent		False consistent		False inconsistent	
Source-monitoring interview description	False consistent	True	False inconsistent	True	False consistent	True	False inconsistent	True
Single experience Repeated experience	.66 (.45) .50 (.48)	.97 (.13) .85 (.32)	.41 (.45) .25 (.34)	1.00 (.00) .77 (.39)	.40 (.39) .39 (.48)	.94 (.16) .75 (.36)	.22 (.35) .32 (.46)	.88 (.28) .92 (.19)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ^a False suggestions were inaccurately recognized. ^b True descriptions were accurately recognized.

Retraction of false alarms made in the memory interview

First, proportional scores were calculated to see whether the false alarms at the memory interview reflected a genuine belief that children had actually seen those items in the target event. The number of false alarms to the items at the memory interview (i.e., inaccurate recognition of false suggestions) was the denominator, and the number of times that children inaccurately claimed to have seen the corresponding items was the numerator. Hence, a large proportion indicates poor source monitoring.² There was a main effect of biasing interview suggestion because children were more likely to inaccurately claim that they had seen the false-consistent suggestions (M = .60, SD = .46) than the false-inconsistent suggestions (M = .35, SD = .42) in the target event, F(1, 32) = 4.40, p < .05. Inversely, children were able to say that 40% of the false-consistent suggestions and 65% of the false-inconsistent suggestions were provided by the biasing interviewer despite having falsely recognized these items previously. (See the first and third columns of Table 5 to see the means separately for each experience condition.)

Next, proportional scores were computed to see whether children could accurately remember seeing items in the target event despite having inaccurately recognized false descriptions of those items previously (i.e., these are responses to source-monitoring questions containing true details). In contrast to the above proportional scores, the numerator was the number of times children accurately claimed to have seen the corresponding true items in the target event. As can be seen in the second and fourth columns in Table 5, the high scores show that children still remembered seeing the actual items from the target event despite their previous false reports about those items. There was a main effect of experience, F(1,27) = 4.55, p < .05, because children in the single-experience condition (M = .98, SD = .06) had more accurate source-monitoring scores than did children in the repeated-experience condition (M = .81, SD = .35). Source-monitoring accuracy did not differ as a function of the consistency of the suggestion.

Thus, even though children falsely recognized misleading suggestions in the memory interview, they retracted a substantial proportion of their false reports. Furthermore, children reinstated a large proportion of their memories of items that were in the target event when they were explicitly asked whether they had seen these items in the target event.

Retraction of hits in the memory interview

Although the analyses described to this point show that children could retract some of their earlier false reports, it is important to know whether children also retracted their accurate reports; that is, they were overly stringent in their false-memory editing. As in the prior analyses, proportional scores were calculated; however, the denominator here was the number of correct recognitions of true items at the memory interview.

First, we examined children's tendency to claim to have seen false-consistent and false-inconsistent details despite having accurately recognized the corresponding true versions of these items previously at the memory interview. Thus, a high proportion

² Proportional scores can be calculated only for children who made at least one error, and so the degrees of freedom differ in the following analyses. So as not to restrict sample sizes in the analyses, all proportions were collapsed across the variable of delay after independent t tests showed that there were no differences in proportional scores provided at the 1-week and 4-week delays.

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reflects poor source monitoring. There was a main effect of biasing interview because children inaccurately claimed to have seen more false-consistent items (M = .40, SD = .42) than false-inconsistent items (M = .25, SD = .39), F(1, 84) = 4.01, p < .05. Overall, children made source-monitoring errors for about a third of the items despite having accurately recognized the target items previously. Inversely, children were able to accurately identify that the biasing interviewer had provided 60% of the false-consistent suggestions and 75% of the false-inconsistent suggestions. (See the fifth and seventh columns of Table 5 for means separated by condition.)

Finally, we examined whether children accurately remembered seeing target items when they had accurately recognized these items at the memory interview. There was a main effect of experience, F(1,89)=4.07, p < .05, that was qualified by a biasing interview × experience interaction, F(1,89)=6.67, p=.01. Children in the single-experience condition accurately remembered seeing items from the target event (M=.91, SD=.22) more than did children in the repeated-experience condition (M=.83, SD=.28), although the interaction showed that this was true for responses to the false-consistent items only, t(92)=3.43, p=.001. Experience did not affect source monitoring for items that were designated as false inconsistent at the biasing interview, t(92)=0.46, p > .50. (See the sixth and eighth columns of Table 5 for other means.)

In sum, the retraction analyses showed that children were able to retract false reports (i.e., to say that they had not actually seen the false items despite having falsely recognized them previously) but could do so for inconsistent items more than for consistent items. Children made some source-monitoring errors for items that they had accurately recognized previously, but they did this more when confronted with false-consistent suggestions than when confronted with false-inconsistent suggestions. Nevertheless, true report retractions occurred substantially less frequently than did false report retractions, but only when the biasing interview suggestions were inconsistent with the theme of the detail (children retracted 40% of both their false and true reports with respect to false-consistent items, but they retracted 65% of their false reports and just 25% of their true reports with respect to false-inconsistent items). Overall, children with repeated experience were more confused about the source of true and false items than were children who had experienced the event just one time.

Discussion

Children and adults remember script-inconsistent information better than they remember script-consistent information (e.g., Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Neuschatz et al., 2002; Pezdek et al., 1989). We investigated whether the consistency of suggestions to details in a repeated event might affect children's suggestibility when they are asked about a single instance of the event. The evidence shows that children were clearly more resistant to suggestions that were script inconsistent than to those that were script consistent. The effect was observed both when the recognition test probed the suggestions from the biasing interview and when the suggestions were presented for the first time at test. Furthermore, children continued to cling to their false reports of consistent suggestions more than they clung to their false reports of inconsistent suggestions. These results extend previous research by showing how the consistency of false suggestions to a repeated event can lead to both increases and decreases in children's suggestibility when children are questioned about a particular instance of a repeated event. In addition, these results show that children's source-monitoring skills varied depending on the consistency of suggested details. Children were better able to identify the interviewer as the source of inconsistent suggestions, and thus to retract earlier false reports, than they were at identifying her as the source of consistent suggestions; children, especially those with prior event experience, seemed to genuinely believe that many of the false-consistent suggestions had actually occurred during the target event.

Why might children be more suggestible when confronted with script-consistent suggestions than with script-inconsistent suggestions? According to fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), false memories can occur when false-but-gist-consistent options are presented (Brainerd et al., 2002). Thus, false memories are more likely when false suggestions are gist consistent than when they are gist inconsistent. Acceptance of false-butgist-consistent suggestions may occur because these suggestions give rise to a feeling of familiarity that is mistaken for a memory of an experienced detail. The script confirmation-deployment model (Farrar & Goodman, 1992) offers an alternative explanation: More information-processing resources are directed toward encoding script-inconsistent details than script-consistent details. Although this process explains how memories of presented script-inconsistent details are more accurate than script-consistent details, in the current study the script-inconsistent suggestions may have attracted attention and thus the item may have been clearly and episodically tagged in memory as an instance of a false suggestion. This episodic encoding may have prevented children from accepting the scriptinconsistent items later because they could retrieve the episodic information associated with the first presentation of the suggestion (i.e., by recalling the interviewer making the suggestion). The results of the source-monitoring test support this explanation because the source of script-inconsistent items was identified more often than the source of script-consistent items.

As anticipated on the basis of fuzzy-trace and script theories, the magnitude of the effects depended on how much prior experience children had with the event. We expected that children with repeated experience would show enhanced resistance to false-inconsistent suggestions when compared to children with no prior experience, and the results from the recognition test supported this hypothesis. The finding that the consistency of the suggestion can moderate the effects of experience is a novel finding that may explain why repetition increased suggestibility in some studies (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell & Roberts, 2002) but not in others (e.g., Powell et al., 1999). When the consistency of the suggestion is ignored, children with repeated experience in the current study falsely recognized more details than did children with no prior experience. Hence, at first glance, the results appeared to have replicated studies showing increases in suggestibility following repetition (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell & Roberts, 2002). However, children with repeated experience were better than those with no prior experience at rejecting false-inconsistent suggestions when these suggestions were presented for the first time at test, although experience did not affect recognition after exposure to scriptconsistent suggestions. Thus, the effects of prior experience on suggestibility are moderated by the consistency of the suggestions to the target details. Whether repetition increases suggestibility may be partly dependent on the thematic consistency of the individual variants across a series of occurrences and the consistency of the suggestions to the theme. Further research could focus on identifying the factors and conditions that affect suggestibility after repeated experiences rather than pondering whether repetition simply increases suggestibility.

We had expected that the effect of consistency would be more pronounced after a delay, but this was not supported. The lack of an interaction is unlikely to be the result of a type II error because other predictable effects of retention interval were observed; that is, recognition and source monitoring were more accurate when children were interviewed 1 week, rather than 4 weeks, after the target occurrence, replicating much previous work (e.g., Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996). Rather, consistency probably did not interact with retention interval because the "short" delay in the current study was actually longer than that used in previous studies reporting increases in false recognition of script-consistent details over time (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1998; Lampinen et al., 2001; Neuschatz et al., 2002; Ornstein et al., 1998). In these studies, recognition was tested within 24 h of the target event, whereas the children in the short delay condition of the current study were tested after 1 week. Hence, any effects of highly consistent suggestions may already have occurred by the time we tested the children. The 1-week and 4-week delays in the current study were chosen for ecological validity because most incidents of abuse reported by child witnesses occur more than 24 h before the children are interviewed. It would be interesting, however, to study the magnitude of the consistency effect at very short delays to enable generalization to cases when immediate interviews are possible.

We expected that the effect of consistency in recognition would be tied closely to children's source monitoring of the experienced and suggested details. Indeed, there were strong correlations between the recognition and source-monitoring scores for both script-consistent and script-inconsistent items. Specifically, correct acceptance of experienced details and correct rejection of suggestions were associated with accurate identification of details as originating in the target occurrence and biasing interview, respectively. Hence, false recognitions of suggested details reflected beliefs that the details had genuinely been witnessed during the target occurrence. The relation between source monitoring and suggestibility has been theorized for some time (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), but the current findings contribute to the growing body of literature providing direct empirical evidence of the relation (e.g., Giles, Gopnik, & Heyman, 2002; Leichtman, Morse, Dixon, & Spiegel, 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001; Thierry & Spence, 2002). It would be interesting to investigate whether children's beliefs that the suggested details were experienced during the target occurrence were accompanied by recollective experiences, as would be expected from "phantom recollection" (Brainerd et al., 2001; Neuschatz et al., 2002). Replicating the current study using a recall test rather than a recognition test would indicate whether children were actually retrieving false episodic details and would clarify the generalizability of the results to a variety of question formats.

The source-monitoring results suggest that the familiarity mechanism in fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) explains false memories of gist-consistent items but not of gist-inconsistent items. Gist-consistent items seem familiar to children, who misattribute the familiar feeling to prior contact with the items in the target event; in the current study, children's explicit claims that they had seen gist-consistent items support this idea. Gist-inconsistent items would also be familiar to children in the current study, however, because the suggestions were repeated at the biasing, memory, and source-monitoring interviews, yet children sometimes were able to correctly attribute the familiarity to the interviews rather than to the target event (65% of these items were correctly attributed to the interviewers). Children seemed to have encoded source-specifying

information for gist-inconsistent items better than they encoded source information for gist-consistent items. Thus, fuzzy-trace theory explains the initial resistance to gist-inconsistent suggestions (as does script theory [e.g., Farrar & Goodman, 1992]). The current results, however, highlight that specific source-monitoring processes might need to be incorporated into these theoretical models to explain resistance to gist-inconsistent items over time. Perhaps the presentation of gist-inconsistent items was so salient that children were motivated to encode source-specifying information at the time of presentation; false memories invoked by feelings of familiarity could be resisted later on by retrieval of the source-specifying information associated with gist-inconsistent suggestions.

Several lines of evidence in the current study suggest that the gist-consistent suggestions actually interfered with children's memories of the final occurrence in the series. Children with prior experience were no better at recognizing details from the occurrence than they were at resisting false suggestions, at least when tested after 4 weeks. When children were asked to identify the source of details, children with prior experience were more accurate at attributing the false-consistent suggestions to the interviewer than they were at attributing the false-consistent suggestions retroactively interfered with children's memories of the target detail to the target occurrence. Thus, it is plausible that, following repeated experiences, the script-consistent suggestions retroactively interfered with children's memories of the target details, preventing them from identifying the details that they had actually witnessed (Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy, & Winfrey, 1992; Chandler, 1991). Although children acquiesced to the inconsistent suggestions at the biasing interview, these suggestions had fewer long-lasting effects on their reports than did the consistent suggestions. Support for this assertion also comes from the retraction analyses, which showed that children could retract false reports or reinstate true memories for inconsistent items more than they could for consistent items.

It would be interesting to further study the parameters of the consistency effect in eyewitness memories across a variety of ages given differences in gist or script extraction (Brainerd et al., 2002). Although there are few studies on children's suggestibility after repeated experiences, the effects that have been demonstrated do not seem to be dependent on age per se. Because the patterns of effects in older children (e.g., ages 6–8 years) and younger children (e.g., ages 3-5 years) are virtually identical (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell et al., 1999), differences may lie in the magnitude of the effects (e.g., older children usually are more accurate than younger children).³ Research in developmental differences may advance through investigation of the factors likely to moderate event repetition effects on suggestibility, factors that are associated with age. Such factors may include the development of source-monitoring skills, resistance to interference, the complexity of the event, and the amount of experience needed for children of different ages to develop scripts. Furthermore, it would be important to better understand how the nature of the inconsistency may increase or decrease children's resistance to suggestibility and how this interacts with age and interview technique. Age differences are found in recall of repeated events more often than in recognition, and atypical actions that disrupt the event are better recalled than atypical actions that are irrelevant to the goal of the event (e.g., Hudson, 1988).

³ The analyses reported in the current study were repeated controlling for age in months, and the effects remained statistically significant.

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In sum, the results of the current study show that 6- and 7-year-olds are more resistant to script-inconsistent suggestions than to script-consistent suggestions. This effect is magnified when gist traces of events are likely strong such as after repeated experiences. These results clarify discrepancies in the literature regarding the effects of repetition on children's suggestibility and indicate that prior experience increases suggestibility to gist-consistent suggestions but reduces suggestibility to gist-inconsistent suggestions. Furthermore, consistent suggestions may interfere with memories of the actual events, thereby reducing the possibility of reinstatement. From a practical perspective, child witnesses who allege multiple abuse and who appear to draw on a script (e.g., by talking in the present/future tense as in "He will lock the door" or "She leaves me in the bedroom") may be at increased risk for creating false memories after exposure to gist-consistent suggestions. When presented with gist-inconsistent suggestions that are nevertheless plausible, however, children may be able to resist the suggestions and even retract them if given the opportunity to identify the source of the suggestions. The results suggest that it may be worthwhile to develop source identification procedures for use by forensic interviewers. Overall, these results suggest that forensic interviewers should be especially cautious about suggesting details that may have occurred in other instances of abuse (i.e., that are consistent with the gist or script of the abuse) when questioning about a specific instance.

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