The English Civil War, or Revolution, depending on who is asked, is one of the most studied events in history. There is an abundance of research and written material by countless historians, who have tried to examine the causes and origins of the Civil War, and whether or not a Revolution even occurred. Historiographically, there have been several differing schools of thought that have changed over the years. These differing interpretations of events can be divided most prominently into three different groups that consist of Whigs, Marxists, and Revisionists. Regardless of what school of historiographical thought that one embraces, there is no doubt that events in Scotland, and more importantly, the Bishops' Wars, played a large role in the outbreak of Civil War. By studying the work of various historians and by taking a closer look at Anglo-Scottish relations, an attempt is made to decipher the events in Scotland and to try to examine just crucial the Bishops' Wars were as a prelude to Civil War.

Before conducting a closer analysis of the role of the Bishops' Wars in the English Civil War, it is important to take a more in-depth look at the differing historiographical interpretations of the Civil War. Up until the early twentieth century, the Whig interpretation of the English Civil War was the predominant view. Peter Gaunt notes that the nineteenth century, especially through the work of S.R Gardiner, and the academic, archival, and document based approach to the Civil War, led to the emergence of the Whig school of thought.¹ Historians who adhered to the Whig interpretation believed that the Civil War was part of a long struggle to achieve democracy as well as religious toleration. This interpretation traces its roots back to Victorian and Edwardian England.² For Whigs, there was a certain inevitability about the Civil War, as a battle raged for several decades between the absolutist monarchy and the Parliamentary House
of Commons, which sought to curb that power. Religion also played a central role for Whig historians as there was an intensifying conflict between reform-minded Protestants and an intolerant Crown, which resulted in a 'Puritan Revolution.'

As the Second World War approached, the Whig approach was beginning to be challenged by historians. These historians believed that the political and constitutional conflicts that the Whigs were focused on, were the consequences, rather than the source of the conflicts and that the origins of the conflict could be found in the socio-economic developments in the pre-war decades. This new historiographical approach became known as Marxism. Marxist historians focused on what they deemed to be an emerging capitalist class and a subsequent 'Bourgeois Revolution.' This theory could be seen in full-effect by one Marxist historian by the name of R.H. Tawney, who firmly believed that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw an emerging capitalist class that coincided with the rise of the gentry and the decline of the aristocracy.

However, starting in the 1970's, historians began to challenge the Marxist approach, just like Marxists had challenged the Whigs before them. This new approach became known as Revisionism. Revisionists believed that attempts to explain the Civil War by socio-economic patterns amounted to a dismal failure. By looking into family and local history, they were able to point out that there were no clear, broadly-based, socio-economic trends that were common to each side in the war. They noted that each class was divided by the Civil War and there was no clear way to distinguish them from one another.

Along with rejecting the Marxist view, Revisionists also rejected teleological history as well as the idea that the Civil War had long-term causes. Revisionists also
point out that there was a strong royalist culture where people were afraid of change and resisted it every step of the way.\textsuperscript{10}

The revisionist view has been met with opposition because it has been viewed as largely negative. Revisionists have been effective at destroying different historiographical interpretations of the Civil War, but haven't been very effective in creating their own explanation.\textsuperscript{11} Opposition can be found even within the Revisionist movement itself, as Revisionists like Conrad Russell, John Morrill, and John Adamson have all argued for their own different causes of the Civil War.\textsuperscript{12} This inability to see eye to eye led Glenn Burgess to proclaim that Revisionism is, "not a school but an amorphous generational trend."\textsuperscript{13} As a result, a new post-revisionism historiographical trend has emerged within recent years.

A quick look at Anglo-Scottish relations in the years leading up to the Bishops' Wars is also important. C.V. Wedgwood does a good job of outlining Anglo-Scottish relations from 1603-1640. Wedgwood makes the argument that the Crown's authority was beginning to weaken before the death of King James. She claims that Charles I made two very significant miscalculations regarding the Scots. Not only did Charles miscalculate the actual level of authority that he possessed in Scotland, but he also misread the state of popular feeling between the English and the Scots.\textsuperscript{14}

Wedgwood outlines three phases in the span of thirty-five years that resulted in a full-scale Scottish rebellion. The first and shortest phase occurred when the king, along with both the English and Scottish councils, worked towards the closer union of the two countries. This phase came to an end when this scheme was met with strong opposition in both countries. The second phase was the reorganization of the Scottish Church, along
with the imposition of a new Book of Common Prayer, to bring it more closely in line with the Anglican model. The third and final phase occurred after Charles I came to the throne and efforts to reorganize the Scottish Privy Council and the Church were intensified. These attempts by the throne to create one unified sovereign did succeed, but not in the way Charles had hoped or anticipated. The opposition on both sides led to a mutual affection by the two countries that was born out of resistance to the crown, rather than through monarchial policy.

J.R. Tanner is a prominent example of a Whig historian. In true Whig fashion, his lectures that are featured in the *English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century* begin with religious and constitutional conflicts in the parliaments of James I. In regards to Scotland and the Bishops' Wars, his lecture on "The Long Parliament and Reform," while rather short, is the one that deserves the most focus.

For Tanner, the issuing of a new Book of Canons in 1636, along with the 11 years of tyranny, and Charles' stubbornness, led to the English defeat in the Bishops' Wars and the eventual calling of the Long Parliament. Tanner argues that the new Book of Canons, along with the new Book of Common Prayer, led to mass rioting in Scotland in 1637. This rioting eventually led to the forming of the National Covenant in 1638, where members pledged to "recover the purity and liberty of the Gospel as it was established and professed." The forming of the Covenant was something that was embraced by members of all the classes of Scotland and as a result, was the protest of an entire nation against the introduction of episcopacy in Scotland.

While it was eventually agreed that the new Canons and Prayer book would be dropped, the Assembly at Glasgow turned into a massive riot, which Charles took as a
declaration of war. Tanner makes the claim that the Scots were able to muster 22,000 soldiers, most of whom were professionals, while Charles could only come up with 14,000, due to a lack of funds and the inability to assemble quickly. Since Charles had not summoned a parliament, his funds quickly evaporated, and the First Bishops' War ended with the Treaty of Berwick on June 18, 1639, without a single shot being fired.20

Even with the signing of the Treaty of Berwick, Charles was still determined to continue the conflict with the Scots and try to impose episcopacy on them. Charles relied heavily on the advice of the Earl of Strafford, and Tanner emphasizes that Strafford misread the temperament of Parliament.21 Pym was able to convince the House of Commons that the redress of grievances should come before they granted the Charles money to continue his war against the Scots. This led to Charles dissolving the Short Parliament and resorting once again to force to continue his battle with the Scots. This turned out to be a complete disaster as the City of London refused a loan, the English soldiers were bordering on mutiny, and the Irish troops could not be ready in time. Without the proper funding and a lack of troops, Charles was unable to take the war to the Scots and the English were routed at Newburn by General Leslie.22 The Treaty of Ripon concluded the Second Bishop's War, where it was agreed that England would pay the occupying army eight-hundred and fifty pounds a day until a permanent settlement was reached.23

Tanner's lectures take the form of a chronological narrative and he makes the argument that Charles' stubbornness in refusing to compromise with the Scots and his refusal to discuss the grievances of parliament ultimately led to his failures in the Bishops' Wars and the eventual calling of the Long Parliament. Without the help of
Parliament, he simply could not fund his campaign against the Scots and lacked the ability to launch an offensive. On top of that, the mutinous nature of the English troops and his inability to muster enough soldiers only exacerbated the problem.

On the complete opposite end of the spectrum from Tanner, lays the staunch and passionate revisionist Conrad Russell. Russell firmly believed that a revolution did not take place in England. He claims that there was no intention to create civil war until the last minute, and that any attempt to explain an intention to create civil war is an attempt to explain a non-event.  

Russell lists a string of seven consecutive events that were crucial in trying to explain why civil war eventually broke out in England, and the Bishops' Wars were at the heart of these events. In fact, three out of these seven events dealt with the Bishops' Wars, and they included: the Bishops' Wars themselves, England's defeat in the Bishops' Wars, and the failure to reach a settlement.  

In both the *Causes of the English Civil War* and *The Fall of the British Monarchies*, Russell presents the idea of what he calls the Scottish Imperial Vision of the church, where Scotland wanted the Anglican Church to fall in line with the Scottish Church. This imperial vision, along with the fact that the two nations would never agree over the abolition of Bishops, is what eventually put England and Scotland on the road to War.  

In *The Fall of the British Monarchies*, Russell tries to answer the questions of why England lost the Bishops' Wars and the effect that the wars had on English public opinion. He points out that it is important to remember that there were two Bishops' Wars
and the causes for failure in one are not the same as the causes for failure in the second, and that each war needs to be discussed separately.  

Russell claims weaknesses in England's financial and military systems are mostly to blame for England's defeat in the first war. Finances were certainly a concern during the first war, since Charles did not summon a Parliament to grant him subsidies and had no major source of steady credit. However, failure with the military system and the lack of arms is what Russell cites the most. Not only was there a lack of arms, but the arms industry itself had not grown to the point where it would be able to produce a sufficient supply that would be needed during wartime. Also, a lot of the arms that were rounded up were hardly serviceable and, as a result, the Ordnance Office had to resort to buying arms from abroad, which took a long time to arrive. Not only did Charles have to deal with a lack of arms, but impressment became an issue as well. Russell notes that the parliaments of the 1620's didn't leave the monarchy with any secure legal basis for impressment and many other things that were critical to running an effective military campaign. Without this secure legal basis, Charles also had to deal with large numbers of deserters.

Before looking into the failures of the Second Bishops' War, it is important to look at the dealings of the Short Parliament, which Russell does. Charles had come to the conclusion that he needed one million pounds to continue his war with the Scots. Russell argues that it was important to understand that Charles viewed the war with Scotland as a foreign war, while Parliament viewed it as a domestic rebellion. This difference in opinion was crucial to Russell because Charles thought that he should be granted his money right away, while Parliament, after not meeting for eleven years, at least expected consultation and the redress of grievances to take place. While members of Parliament
were not averse to granting subsidies to Charles, they wanted the redress of grievances, especially ship money, to take place before any talk of loans and grants. Russell notes that Charles' rejection of Parliament's final offer ultimately led to the dissolution of the Short Parliament and his desire to continue to wage his war against Scotland.

After discussing his reasoning for the failure of the first war, as well as exploring the workings of the Short Parliament, Russell then proceeds to find the reasons for England's shortcomings in the Second Bishops' War. He points out that Charles relied heavily upon the advice of Strafford, who remarked that, "the quiet of England will hold out long," which plays into Russell's core argument that England was not on the brink of revolt. Strafford also urged Charles to use his Irish army, whose members, he believed, would be more obedient due to their Catholic background.

Russell argues that trouble began for Charles when the mustering of troops was continually delayed due to a shortage of money, which also affected the arrival time of supplies. People in local communities also began to grow agitated due to the impressed soldiers that were living in their counties. One point that Russell makes is the issue of coat and conduct money that was supposed to be raised by the counties to clothe and feed the troops. Counties began refusing to raise the money and the troops even began to release the men that were imprisoned for refusing to pay. The refusal to raise the coat and conduct money, along with the now mutinous nature of the soldiers, was shaping up to be a disaster. The lack of funds and the rebellious temper of the soldiers proved to be the downfall of the army. The army was out of pay before they came into contact with the Scots and Strafford encountered a great deal of resistance in attempting to raise funds.
Unlike the First Bishops' War, the Scots decided to take the war to the English and they easily routed them at Newburn. For Conrad Russell, the English Civil War was far from inevitable and was certainly not the result of a long build-up of political and religious tensions that J.R. Tanner believed it to be. As noted above, Russell believed that a series of seven key events that were focused around the Bishops' Wars is what ultimately led to Civil War. In *The Fall of the British Monarchies*, not only does he continually state this belief but he also tries to explain England's defeat at the hands of Scotland in the Bishops' Wars. At the heart of both losses was the financial and military failures of England to come up with enough funds for the war as well as a lack of arms and supplies. However, Russell makes an important claim that England was in a much better position in the First Bishops’ War than in the second. He argues that Charles was still in control of a paid army and the lack of a parliament would not have affected him as badly in 1639 as it did in 1640. Although Russell does acknowledge that there were pro-Scottish voices in England, he does not go as far as other historians in saying that there was resounding support for Scotland. He argues that there were small minorities that were either pro-Scottish or anti-Scottish, with a large group that was hesitant to take sides. He contends that the war with Scotland was an incredibly polarizing subject and due to the lack of "revolutionary" activity in England, those groups remained small pockets. Lastly, for Russell, the conclusion of the Bishops' Wars meant that Scotland would not be Anglicized in religion, Scotland was able to keep a distinctive identity within a British union, the pressure to Protestantize Ireland would likely grow stronger, the Scots would become a force in English politics, and the King was no longer the sole source of power.
Unlike Conrad Russell, David Cressy does believe that a revolution took place in England. In regards to the Bishops' Wars, Cressy argues that the wars were prompted by Charles' attempt to impose Prayer Book uniformity on Scotland. The first public reading of the prayer book led to rioting, the signing of the National Covenant, and later, to open rebellion. To Cressy, the rejection of the Prayer book was an open challenge to Charles' authority which was intolerable. The crux of Conrad Russell's argument was why England lost to Scotland during the Bishops' Wars, while mentioning a lack of funds and problems with the army as important issues. Cressy does note the economic problems that existed in England during the 1630's, but the focus of his argument is the role that the army played in England's defeat in the wars. Also, in contrast to Russell, Cressy is mostly concerned about the Second Bishops' War, rather than both.

Cressy only briefly discusses the first war in *England on Edge*. He mentions the low morale and the fact that England was bogged down by poor weather and bickering along the lines of command. He notes that the Pacification of Berwick was not destined to last long due to the lingering issue of Episcopacy, and then he proceeds to the issue of the Short Parliament.

Again, just like the First Bishops' War, Cressy does not spend much time on the dealings of the Short Parliament. He notes just how expensive military campaigns were and therefore, why it was necessary for Charles to summon a parliament. As Russell observed, Charles was expecting the immediate granting of subsidies, while Parliament wanted the redress of grievances. One interesting claim that Cressy makes is that besides being upset about ship-money and Laudian religious policies, some members of Parliament may have sabotaged the voting of subsidies since they found a common cause
with their religious brethren among the Presbyterian Scots.\textsuperscript{46} As it became clear that Parliament's desires would take precedence, Charles dissolved the Short Parliament and was determined to carry on his war with the Scots.\textsuperscript{47} Cressy spends a mere three pages on the First Bishops' War and the Short Parliament before jumping to the Second War and discussing the nature and makeup of the army. He notes that there was no standing army in England at the time and assembling a fighting force became a real test of royal authority.\textsuperscript{48} The Crown was forced to rely on impressment, and many of the impressed soldiers were not fit for service. On top of that, many of the people that were best suited to serve could buy their way out of service.\textsuperscript{49} The lack of funds became a problem as it bogged down recruitment and delayed the delivery of supplies. The troops were ill-equipped and the weather spread fear of disease and a return of the plague. Cressy argues that this rag tag group of soldiers, along with being ill-equipped, made them averse to authority and that problems were inevitable.

Cressy goes on to discuss the outbreak of problems that occurred with the army from the very beginning. Desertion was the first issue that the Crown faced. The process of gathering troops was slow and many of the impressed men never made it to their rendezvous points and others deserted at the first opportunity.\textsuperscript{50} The soldiers that did meet their rendezvous points were far from civil and obedient. Cressy notes that there was a multitude of problems for the officers in command. Delays in the mobilization of troops resulted in a lot of disorderly conduct, as restless troops were prone to acts of violence and pillaging in the communities that they were staying in.\textsuperscript{51} Mutinies became quite common as well and Cressy tells stories of multiple accounts of soldier rebellion.\textsuperscript{52} Religion also played a large role in these rebellions as troops began directing their
outbursts against religious targets. Many of these outbursts were directed against Roman-Catholic victims and soldiers soon began to refuse orders from their officers who they suspected of being Catholic.

For Cressy, the Scottish victory at Newburn caused several problems. The first problem remained the army. In spite of the large number of deserters, Charles had over 17,000 men in arms. Even though these troops had made it to the end of the war, it did not mean that they were any more well-behaved than those that had previously deserted. The troops were held in Yorkshire for ten months before an official settlement with the Scots was made. The discontented troops were still prone to acts of violence and were angry over a lack of pay. Their stay in Yorkshire was also putting a monetary strain on an already weakened government.

The loss in the Bishops' Wars caused financial strains that reached beyond just the upkeep of the army. Cressy points out that the Scottish occupation of Newcastle also put a strangle on the nation's supply of coal. The English relied heavily on the coal that was supplied from Newcastle and the Scottish occupation was crippling for them. As a result of the occupation, everyone faced cutbacks in energy and the limited supply of coal led to rising prices that further strained England's economic system.

While Conrad Russell explored the reasons for England's loss in the Bishops' Wars, David Cressy took a different historiographical approach towards the wars. Most of Cressy's attention is centered on the Second Bishops' War and the problems in the army that were the result of a lack of funds and poor coordination. Cressy argues that the problems within the army and the Scottish occupation of Newcastle caused problems for England even after the war was over. The soldiers were still discontented with their pay
and poor conditions and the Scottish stranglehold of England's coal supply gave the Scots a strong bargaining chip in trying to reach a permanent settlement with England.

Besides Tanner, Russell, and Cressy, there are a multitude of other historians who give their take on the Bishops' Wars, and they include David Scott, John Adamson, Ian Gentles, and Michael Braddick. The first of these historian, David Scott, tries to take a narrative approach towards events in the Stuart Kingdoms and the Bishops' Wars.

Scott notes that even with the impending wars, Scotland was not a completely united nation and it was divided between the Highland and Lowland Scots. As far as the relationship between England and Scotland is concerned, Scott argues that things took a turn for the worse once Charles came to the throne. Charles' desire for order and obedience, along with his wish to advance the royal prerogative without the use of consultation, is what put England and Scotland on the road to war.

For Scott, the immediate cause of the Bishops' Wars was the attempt by Laud to impose the new book of prayer on the Scots. The Scots objected to the new book on the grounds that it had been introduced without consultation, it represented an importation of Anglican practices into Scottish worship, and it threatened to sully the purity of religion in Scotland. Scott points out that the riots that broke out in response to the prayer book were not spontaneous and that planned resistance had been in the works for months. The Scots now sought to limit the royal prerogative and created the National Covenant, with the hopes that compromise could be reached if there was complete unity in Scotland. The covenant was a revolutionary document that truly challenged the prerogative and Charles' supremacy. It was a covenant with God that gave the people the right to resist Charles if he failed to defend their religion. Lastly, the covenant gave the Scots a sense
of political awareness and all of the subscribers, regardless of class, felt like they were a part of the process.\textsuperscript{67}

As others like Russell and Cressy have mentioned, Scott points out that Charles took the covenant as an act of sedition and refused to back down. He showed no signs of finding a political solution to the problem and quickly began to think of using the military to crush the covenanters.\textsuperscript{68}

Scott argues that the Scottish army was more than matched by the English. Charles planned to launch a four pronged assault and even planned to invade Scotland if necessary.\textsuperscript{69} However, as Cressy pointed out, problems began immediately and only the King's English army could be relied upon and even they struggled with assembly and quality.\textsuperscript{70} Interestingly, Scott makes the claim that most of the King's troops were just as well-armed and supplied as their opponents, the army's morale was growing, and there was great determination to do well in battle.\textsuperscript{71} Scott argues that the decision to treat with the Scots at Berwick was Charles' greatest mistake and that he soon recognized this error when he decided to launch his second campaign.\textsuperscript{72}

For Scott, the second war was the most pivotal conflict of the period and is what ultimately led to the Irish rebellion and civil war in England.\textsuperscript{73} Scott also argues that the Short Parliament's refusal to grant subsidies was far more than just a financial setback for Charles. This refusal was also an indication that some members of parliament were also questioning the legal basis for Charles' war against the Scots.\textsuperscript{74}

Scott also brings up the idea of collusion that John Adamson touches upon as well. Scott notes that several members of parliament had been plotting with the Covenanters to launch a Scottish invasion of England, which would force the king to
summon a parliament that would sit for quite some time. In order for this plan to succeed, Parliament had to create enough opposition to the King's policies and the Covenanters had to make sure that they had enough friends in England for the invasion to work. The English defeat at Newburn gave Parliament the opportunity it needed as Charles was forced to summon what would be known as the Long Parliament.

Scott's examination of the Bishops' Wars adds more historiographical depth to the historians that have been looked at so far. His look at the army is quite interesting since it is contradictory to a lot of other historians. He argues that even though there was poor assembly, that the morale of the troops was not severely low, that they were just as adequately supplied as the Scottish army, and that many even wished to do well. Scott's account includes no stories of rebellion or mutinies, no complaints of a lack of pay, and no accounts of the stress that the army put on local counties. He adds that the Second War is what led to the Irish rebellion and full scale civil war in England. Scott also touches upon the idea of Parliament's collusion with the Scots, which is an issue that needs further examining. Lastly, Scott tries to debunk the Marxist claim of a social revolution by arguing that a prominent man like Argyll, would not have sided with the Covenanters cause if there really was a 'bourgeois revolution.'

John Adamson also takes a narrative approach in discussing the English Civil War and the overthrow of Charles I in his work The Noble Revolt. Adamson notes that there was a massive growth in reading and the circulation of books, which led to people questioning the extent of royal power. Some people began to believe that the King had a contract between himself and the people that he ruled over, and that in some cases, resistance and rebellion could be justified.
He also points out that religion tended to be the 'tinderbox' of rebellion and that the Scottish revolt posed the biggest threat to English stability since the Spanish Armada.\footnote{79} The union between England and Scotland had only been in place since 1603, and centuries of warfare between the two nations had preceded this union. Therefore it was no surprise that integration was far from successful and Charles' strong desire to Anglicize Scotland and the Scottish Church was met with rioting and protests.\footnote{80}

Adamson does briefly mention some of the things that other historians have covered in greater depth, such as economic problems in England, the eleven years tyranny, and some of the problems that hampered the army. However, Adamson's focus is mostly on the collusion that took place between the Covenanters and members of the House of Commons, which David Scott mentioned in his work. The time period that Adamson is concerned with is the period between the dissolution of the Short Parliament and the opening of the Long Parliament.

While other historians have noted that the Short Parliament was dissolved because Parliament was refusing the granting of subsidies, Adamson makes the claim that the timing of the dissolution and how quickly it was carried out, may have been a sign of the growing number of dissidents in the House of Commons who were pro-Scottish.\footnote{81} He also points out that contact with the dissidents and Covenanters had been taking place for at least a half-decade before the Short Parliament, with Saye, Brooke, and Warwick being the most prominent dissidents.\footnote{82} The summer of 1640 is when promises were first made between the covenanters and dissidents assuring that the English would help come to the aid of their 'friends.' While the English did not want to join the Scottish army or commit to anything that would amount to treason and ultimately undermine their cause, they did
send a letter to the Scots that assured them that they would act in concert with them. The English began pressuring the Scots for an invasion and the Scots obliged. The Scots encountered almost no opposition and easily routed the English forces.

For Adamson, the collusion between the English and the Covenanters insured that Charles would not be able to forcibly Anglicize Scotland and that Scotland had now emerged as an effective force. More importantly, however, the dissidents in the Commons had benefited the most, since they now had the power to influence the rest of Charles' regime and there were now rival parties in England with the backing of military resources. The collusion between the Scots and the English is an important topic that David Scott briefly touched upon. However, Adamson covers it in much greater detail by looking at the individual people involved and is also able to show that the collusion had a powerful impact on the outcome of the Bishops' Wars and the calling of the Long Parliament.

Ian Gentles is another historian who covers the Bishop's Wars. For Gentles, Charles' problems also began with Scotland and the issue of religion. On top of that, the Scots became anxious as the size of the nobility grew and they became threatened by Charles' revocation, or his attempt to recover all royal land.

As other historians have already noted, the National Covenant was an important document that evoked strong emotional reactions from everyone. The Covenanters believed that everyone who signed the Covenant was equal and that they were all bound to one another.

When discussing the Bishops' Wars, Gentles does make some interesting claims. He notes that Charles' army was well supplied and that the ordnance office acted quite
smoothly. Gentles also argues that King Charles was not as stubborn as people believe and that he was willing to consult and compromise, which is quite contrary to many peoples' belief that his stubbornness was the trigger behind the Bishops' Wars. Lastly, Gentles notes the effects that the Scottish victories had. The Scots had thrown out the Bishops, twice defended themselves against Charles, and their actions were closely watched by Ireland and England, who would soon follow their lead and rebel as well.

Lastly, Michael Braddick does an excellent job of looking at the Bishops' Wars in great detail. He is able to examine effectively the religious and political times that ultimately led to the rise of the covenant movement and eventually civil war. Although the chapters in Braddick's work, God's Fury, England's Fire, are in chronological order, the material inside is not, and some topics can be found in multiple chapters due to the depth and background information that is required to understand the issues at hand.

Braddick touches upon a lot of the issues that other historians have looked at, such as the fact that Charles had to rely exclusively on royal forces since his multi-pronged assault failed, due to the fact other forces had trouble assembling.88

However, most of Braddick's attention is directed toward the Covenanters. He makes the point that they had no problem with England, but were merely taking the necessary action to defend their religion and liberties.89 While this would seem like an obvious point due to the support that the covenant movement eventually gained in England, it is still noteworthy. He also points out that the covenanters were crucial in the Pacification of Berwick that ended the first war. While not everyone in Scotland supported the Covenanters, the overall unity of the Scots, along with the fact that many of
the English felt that the Scots were in the right, is what led Charles to begin negotiations.  

Braddick then explores the details of the Short Parliament which have already been discussed. However, he does note that the failure of the Short Parliament revealed a strong sense of anti-papery and that a failed parliament was worse than no parliament, which was ultimately proved to be true by the defeat of the English at the hands of the Scots and the calling of the Long Parliament.  

After explaining the obvious problems that occurred with the English army due to a lack of funds, Braddick's attention shifts to the Scottish invasion. He observes that the Scots were initially reluctant to invade England because they were unsure how they would be received. To Braddick, the debate on whether or not to invade was the first initial sign of division within the Covenanters. Eventually, the decision to invade was made and they were not disappointed by the reception that they received. Again, the Scots encountered almost no opposition and the English geographical disadvantage led to an easy Scottish victory. The Treaty of Ripon ended the Second Bishops' War, and due to the fact that the English had to pay the Covenanters 850 pounds a day until a permanent settlement was reached, it guaranteed that the next parliament would not be easily dissolved. According to Braddick, Ripon also guaranteed that the Scottish reformation would be connected to the English redress of grievances and that it also created a connection between the position of Parliament and the future of reformed religion. Lastly, the failures in the Bishops' Wars forced the summoning of a parliament which now gave a perfect opportunity to members to discuss the grievances that had accumulated over eleven years.
Michael Braddick's account of the Bishops' Wars is a very detailed one. While he does not focus very much on the actual battles, his look into the politics at the time is rather impressive. One important piece of historiography that Braddick is able to add is the idea that the Scottish invasion was not an invasion, but a demonstration by the covenanters appealing to sympathizers in England.\(^{95}\) This is an interesting point because what both David Scott and John Adamson have already pointed to is the idea of collusion between the Covenanters and the members of the House of Commons. Also, as Adamson noted, there was careful work done by the Commons to try to sabotage the King's war, so there would not be a lot of bloodshed that would make the English turn away from the Covenant cause.

David Stevenson's work on the Scottish Revolution is important to the historiography of the Bishops' Wars because it looks at the wars through a Scottish perspective. His book, *The Scottish Revolution: 1637-44*, takes a narrative approach, that begins with the causes of discontent in Scotland and concludes with the rule of the Covenanters in Scotland. Stevenson's book is very detailed and takes an in-depth look at the causes of discontent, the New Book of Common Prayer and the formation of the National Covenant, the Glasgow Assembly, both of the Bishops' Wars, and the failure of the Pacification of Berwick.

For Stevenson, the causes of discontent could be found in the rule of Charles I and his religious policies. Along with the changes in religious policies, Charles made things worse for himself in Scotland by his secretiveness, tactlessness, and arrogance.\(^{96}\) Stevenson notes that Charles refused to take into account the feeling and opinions of his subjects, which is something that many other historians have pointed out.
While much has been made of the poor recruitment and organization that plagued the English, Stevenson notes that organization in Scotland went rather smoothly. There were systematic efforts throughout the country to raise an army, ranks were based on military skill rather than by class, and there was not a lot of resistance to the covenant.97

Stevenson argues that the Covenanters were not interested in becoming completely independent from England. He believed that it would be impractical for them to do so and it would arouse hostility from the English, which would all but kill their cause. Rather, they sought to create a closer union between themselves and their counterparts in the English Parliament.98

The idea of friendship between members of Parliament and the Covenanters is something that has been touched upon by other historians such as John Adamson, but is further elaborated upon by Stevenson. The failure of the Short Parliament was the first indication that the Covenanters may have had support in England, as it illustrated that members of parliament would not support a war against Scotland.99 Stevenson argues that the idea of friendship could be even better illustrated when Parliament ignored the fact that Charles had revealed that the Scots were seeking help from the French and the cause continued to gain support in England.100

In discussing the preparation for the Second Bishop's War, Stevenson points out that many of the problems that plagued the English were non-existent when it came to the Scots. Not only were they better organized and faced little opposition, but many of the foreign-trained officers who had served in the first war had already been paid during the winter, so lack of pay was largely a non issue.101
As Adamson mentioned, the English would not go so far as to take up arms with the Scots, since it would amount to treason, but they did give the vague promise to help them in any way that they could. So on August 3rd, the decision to invade England was made. Stevenson argues that the Scots had little to fear from the English army and there was no possible way for Charles to raise enough troops to defeat the Scots. For Stevenson, the loss of the second war and the Treaty of Ripon were devastating for Charles. England had been successfully invaded, was forced to pay the invading army, and Charles was forced to summon a parliament that had pro-Scottish sympathies. Lastly, Stevenson questions why Charles chose not to take a personal part in the Treaty of Ripon. Unlike Berwick, he allowed his English and Scottish subjects to negotiate directly with one another. Stevenson reasons that maybe the Scots would be willing to make more concessions if Charles was not involved, which did not work out well for him.

David Stevenson's look at the Bishops' Wars is very valuable in adding to its historiography. Unlike many of the other works regarding the time period, he looks at events through a Scottish point of view. His exploration also confirms many of the previously held beliefs regarding the wars. He touches upon the ideas of collusion, better organization in Scotland, and pro-Scottish sentiments in England to explain the Scottish victories in the wars and the forced calling of the Long Parliament.

After examining some of the historiography surrounding the Bishops' Wars, it becomes apparent that there are several common themes that appear repeatedly, regardless of whether or not a historian is a Whig, Marxist, Revisionist, or post-revisionist. These themes include: the stubbornness of Charles I, religion, military
problems, collusion between the covenagers and members of the commons, the failure of the short parliament, and the idea of war in three kingdoms.

Charles' stubbornness and the problems with religion go hand in hand. While Charles' father James was able to keep things relatively peaceful, Charles possessed a very domineering personality and was determined to bring Scotland in line with England. Charles did not possess the skills that his father did and anything but complete uniformity was unacceptable to him. The rejection of the Prayer Book by the Scots was viewed by Charles as an act of sedition and he felt that he needed to crush the Covenagers.

Similarly, the problems that Charles' military faced and the failure of the Short Parliament go hand in hand as well. Charles' decision to rule without Parliament hampered his ability to raise funds for the First Bishops' War and as a result, the military was faced with inadequate weapons, major supply problems, and a lack of pay. Charles' stubborn refusal to address grievances in the Short Parliament and his decision to dissolve it, proved to be disastrous for him. He again was faced with a lack of funds, and Parliament's refusal to grant subsidies began to show that members of the House of Commons not only disapproved of the war, but pro-Scottish sentiment existed as well.

This pro-Scottish sentiment also led to collusion between the Covenagers and Commons as historians like John Adamson and David Stevenson have pointed out. They both argue that even though the English wouldn't join arms with the Scots, they were willing to help them in whatever way they could because they knew that a Scottish invasion would require the summoning of a parliament that could not be dissolved easily.

Lastly, the idea of Wars in the Three Kingdoms is something that several historians talk about as well. This idea is promoted by Conrad Russell, Ian Gentles, and
David Scott and is clearly seen in the titles of their works as well. This idea is described by Russell as the "billiard ball effect," where the actions in one of Charles' kingdoms had consequences in another. For these historians, the events in Scotland had a strong impact on both Ireland and England. For them, the Scottish rebellion would soon lead to the Irish rebellion and then full-scale revolt in England.

The causes of the English Civil War is one of the most hotly debated topics in history and has led to a series of differing historiographical approaches to describe its origins. While there is disagreement as to whether or not there was a long buildup of political and religious tensions and if the civil war was inevitable, there tends to be a consensus that events in Scotland and the Bishops' Wars is what ultimately led to the English Civil War and the calling of the Long Parliament. The Scottish rejection of the new prayer book led to Charles' decision to take arms. His stubbornness and inability to take into account the feelings and wishes of his own subjects proved to be his downfall and the subsequent Bishops' Wars would change the course of English history.
Works Cited


